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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
THE STATE OF UTAH, ] 
Plaintiff/Respondent, 
vs. 
MICHAEL ALLEN STERGER, ] 
Defendant/Appellant. 
\ Case No. 90078-CA 
) Priority No. 10 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
I. JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
A. JURISDICTION 
This Court has jurisdiction of this appeal under Rule 5, Rules 
of the Utah Court of Appeals and Section 78-2a-3 (2) (e) , Utah Code 
Annotated. 
B. NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS 
This is an interlocutory appeal from an interlocutory order of 
the Sixth Judicial District Court for Garfield County denying 
Defendant/Appellant1s Motions to Suppress Evidence. 
II. STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
ISSUE NO. 1; WAS THE INVENTORY SEARCH AUTHORIZED AND LEGAL 
UNDER THE EXISTING CIRCUMSTANCES? 
ISSUE NO. 2; WAS THE BLOOD SAMPLE LEGALLY TAKEN FROM THE 
DEFENDANT/APPELLANT WHEN THE PERSONS TAKING THE SAME WERE NOT 
AUTHORIZED BY LAW TO TAKE IT? 
ISSUE NO. 3: WAS THE BLOOD SAMPLE LEGALLY TAKEN OF THE 
DEFENDANT/APPELLANT WHEN IT WAS TAKEN AFTER THE OFFICER HAD MADE A 
WRONG STATEMENT TO THE DEFENDANT/APPELLANT REGARDING HIS BEING 
REQUIRED TO SUBMIT TO THE TAKING THEREOF AND PRIOR TO THE IMPLIED 
CONSENT LAW COMING INTO EFFECT? 
III. CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
CONSIDERED DETERMINATIVE 
Fourth Amendment, United States Constitution 
Article I, Section 14, Utah State Constitution 
Section 41-6-44.10(5)(a), Utah Code Annotated 
Section 26-1-30(19) Utah Code Annotated 
IV. STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This is an Interlocutory Appeal from a ruling of the Sixth 
District Court for Garfield County overruling and denying 
Defendant/Appellant's Motions to Suppress Evidence. Two actions are 
pending against Defendant/Appellant in that Court, one consisting of 
a criminal prosecution against him alleging Automobile Homicide, 
Possession of a Controlled Substance (Marijuana) and Possession of 
Drug Paraphernalia as set forth in the Information, a copy of which 
is contained in the Addendum attached hereto and marked as Exhibit 
"B". The criminal action is being prosecuted under Criminal No. 
3368, Garfield County District Court. 
The second action is a quasi-criminal action wherein the State 
of Utah is attempting to forfeit a motor vehicle pursuant to Section 
58-37-13, Utah Code Annotated. Contained in the attached Addendum 
and marked as Exhibit "C" is a copy of the documents served upon the 
Defendant/Appellant, the said action being identified as Civil No. 
3350, Garfield County District Court. 
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Motions to Suppress were filed in both actions and as the fact 
situation would be the same for both, counsel for both parties 
stipulated that the two cases could be joined for hearing on the 
Motions to Suppress, 
At the Preliminary Hearing conducted in the Sixth Circuit Court 
for Garfield County in the Criminal matter, Defendant/Appellant had 
present Byron Ray Christiansen, Jr., Certified Shorthand Reporter, 
to report the proceedings. As there appears to be some dispute in 
the facts, counsel for both parties on this Appeal stipulated that 
the transcript of that Preliminary Hearing could be included in the 
record on Appeal so as to lessen the risk of the matter being 
presented to this Court on a misleading or incorrect statement of 
the facts. 
At the conclusion of the hearing on the Motions to Suppress, 
the Sixth District Court for Garfield County entered its Findings of 
Fact and Conclusions of Law overruling and denying 
Defendant/Appellant's Motions to Suppress. Contained in the 
Addendum attached hereto and marked as Exhibit "A" is a copy of the 
District Court's said Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law. From 
that Order, Defendant/Appellant has requested permission to take 
this Interlocutory Appeal. 
On July 23, 1989, the Defendant/Appellant, his wife, and two 
passengers identified as Donald E. Dudrey and Michelle L. Eckroth, 
were proceeding in a westerly direction on the Notam Extension of 
the Burr Trail in Eastern Garfield County in a 1989 Ford Bronco 
automobile owned by the Defendant/Appellant and his wife, Gina M. 
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Sterger (Transcript of hearing on Motion to Suppress, Page 46; 
Transcript of Preliminary Hearing, Page 17; Addendum, Exhibit "A", 
Pages 1 and 2) . The Stergers were seated in the front seat of the 
automobile and Eckroth and Dudrey were in the rear seat with Eckroth 
being located directly behind the vehicle driver. The parties had 
enjoyed a vacation on Lake Powell for a week and ten days and were 
returning to their respective homes in Southern California via 
Garfield County and the Burr Trail. 
At approximately 6.3 miles West of Utah State Road 276, at 
approximately 2:00 p.m., the vehicle in which the said persons were 
riding, left the road and collided with an embankment, (Addendum 
Exhibit "A", Pages 1 and 2; Transcript of Motion to Suppress 
Hearing, Page 46; Preliminary Hearing Transcript, Pages 17,18 and 
19) which accident apparently resulted in the death of Michelle L. 
Eckroth, although satisfactory expert evidence has not yet been 
presented to the Court as to the actual cause of her death 
(Addendum, Exhibit "A", Page 1 and 2). 
Subsequent to the accident, the Defendant/Appellant went for 
help and found the same and the authorities and a Garfield County 
Ambulance arrived at the scene at approximately 2:50 to 3:00 p.m. 
(Transcript of Preliminary Hearing, Page 17). 
Eckroth, Dudrey and Gina M. Sterger were transported to the 
Page, Arizona Hospital by helicopter (Addendum, Exhibit "A", Page 
2). During the transport or subsequent to their arrival at Page, 
Arizona, Eckroth was declared deceased (Addendum, Exhibit "A", Pages 
1 and 2) . The Defendant/Appellant was transported to the Bullfrog, 
Utah Clinic, although at the time he had not been placed under 
arrest (Addendum, Exhibit "A11, Page 2). Apparently, the reason why 
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he was not also taken to Page, Arizona, was because of lack of space 
on the helicopter and he appeared to be the least injured of the 
four. Prior to his leaving his vehicle on the Notam Extension, he 
had locked the same and retained the keys in his possession 
(Transcript of Motion to Suppress, Page 51). 
The officer handling the investigation of the accident was 
Shawn Draper, Deputy Sheriff of Garfield County (Transcript of 
Preliminary Hearing, Page 16) . Mr. Draper arrived at the scene of 
the accident at approximately 3:00 p.m., or one hour after the 
accident (Preliminary Hearing Transcript, Page 17). As soon as the 
persons in the Bronco vehicle, including the Defendant/Appellant, 
had left the scene, Deputy Draper proceeded to perform an inventory 
search on the subject vehicle (Transcript of Motion to Suppress, 
Pages 48 and 50). This inventory search was performed at the scene 
of the accident without the Defendant/Appellant or any other 
passenger of the vehicle being present and without permission of the 
Defendant/Appellant or anyone else (Transcript of Motion to 
Suppress, Pages 50 and 51). At the time, Deputy Draper discovered a 
closed plastic film canister inside a brown camera case which 
contained marijuana (Transcript of Motion to Suppress Hearing, Pages 
55 and 56) . It is to be noted firstly, that Deputy Draper had to 
use some kind of tool to gain access to the Bronco motor vehicle as 
it was locked (Transcript of Motion to Suppress Hearing, Page 51) 
and, secondly, neither the subject plastic film canister nor its 
contents could be seen without gaining access to the vehicle and 
opening both the plastic film canister and the camera case in which 
it was located. (Transcript of Motion to Suppress Hearing, Page 
64). The vehicle had not been impounded at the time the search was 
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commenced, which was at about 6:00 p.m. on the day in question, 
(Transcript of Motion to Suppress Hearing, Pages 62 and 64) and at 
the time the search was commenced, Mr. Sterger, who was miles away 
at the Bullfrog Clinic, had not been placed under arrest (Transcript 
of Motion to Suppress Hearing, Page 64) . Upon finding the plastic 
film canister, the inventory search was terminated and the subject 
vehicle was removed by wrecker to Deputy Draper's home in Ticaboo, 
Utah, some 20 to 30 miles from the scene of the accident where it 
was left over the night of July 23-24, 1989 (Transcript of Motion to 
Suppress Hearing, Page 65). It is to be noted that the vehicle was 
moved by a wrecker belonging to Hunt's Service of Hanksville, Utah, 
and that its driver was not a police officer or other authority 
(Transcript of Motion to Suppress Hearing, Page 65) and that the 
driver operating the wrecker and taking possession of the subject 
vehicle did not sign any inventory list (Transcript of Motion to 
Suppress Hearing, Pages 65 and 66) . Also, the vehicle was not 
placed in any secured impound area while it remained at the home of 
Deputy Draper in Ticaboo (Transcript of Motion to Suppress Hearing, 
Page 54) . 
The following day, July 24, 1989, the subject vehicle was moved 
to an impound yard belonging to Hunt's Service at Hanksville, Utah, 
and left for further processing. Hanksville is some 50 to 60 
miles from the scene of the accident and some 40 miles from the home 
of Deputy Draper in Ticaboo, Utah (Transcript of Motion to Suppress 
Hearing, Page 70). 
Two days after the accident, Deputy Draper went to the impound 
yard at Hanksville and completed his inventory search (Transcript 
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of Motion to Suppress Hearing, Page 71; Transcript of Preliminary 
Hearing, Page 46) . At that time, he found a closed "Tupperware 
type" plastic container in the rear of the Bronco automobile 
containing what he described in his report as "...Drug 
Paraphernalia, seeds, Zig Zag papers, etc.11. (Transcript of 
Preliminary Hearing, Page 47) . There were other closed containers 
in the subject vehicle consisting of canned foods, food boxes and 
items of like nature, which Deputy Draper did not open and inspect 
(Transcript of Motion to Suppress Hearing, Pages 73 and 74; 
Transcript of Preliminary Hearing, Page 26). 
The authorities do not claim that the two searches of the 
Bronco motor vehicle were made under authority of a warrant or 
incident to an arrest. Rather, they claim that the searches were 
inventory searches made pursuant to Garfield County's standardized 
guidelines, a copy of which is contained in the Addendum attached as 
Exhibit "D"). 
The Garfield County standardized police guidelines, as set 
forth in Section 4.05, do not authorize inventory searches unless 
the vehicle to be searched has been impounded, do not provide for 
bifurcated inventory searches, require that when custody of a 
vehicle changes from one person to another, the person taking 
custody shall place his or her signature on the inventory list and 
require that a written inventory shall be made of all contents of 
the vehicle, both in opened, closed and/or locked containers. 
During the course of events and at some time while he was being 
transported to the Page, Arizona Hospital or subsequent thereto, 
Donald L. Dudrey, one of the passengers in the Bronco vehicle at the 
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time of the accident, began making statements to the authorities 
that the Defendant/Appellant had been consuming alcohol on the 
morning of the accident and was intoxicated at the time of the 
accident. At the scene of the accident, Deputy Draper had smelled 
blood on the Defendant/Appellant, but stated that he had not smelled 
alcohol (Transcript of Preliminary Hearing, Page 81). 
At approximately 6:30 p.m., on July 23, 1989, Deputy Draper 
left the scene of the accident and drove to the Bullfrog Clinic, 
some 10 miles distant. Upon arrival at the Clinic, Deputy Draper 
contacted the Garfield County sheriff and the Sheriff directed him 
to take a blood test of the Defendant/Appellant (Transcript of 
Preliminary Hearing, Pages 43 and 44). At approximately 7:00 p.m. 
on the date in question, Deputy Draper told Mr. Sterger, in words to 
the effect, that ". . . he was required to submit to a blood test 
since he was the driver of the vehicle involved in an accident 
resulting in the death of a passenger" (Transcript of Preliminary 
Hearing, Pages 44 and 74). The Defendant/Appellant thereupon 
submitted to the blood test. Subsequent to the taking of the blood 
sample at approximately 9:20 p.m., the Defendant/Appellant was 
placed under arrest. The analysis of the blood sample taken from 
the Defendant/Appellant showed no alcohol as being present but did 
show "Blood THC (the active ingredient in marijuana) of 2.6 
nanograms per milliliter and Blood COOH-THC Metabolite of 28 
nanograms per milliliter (Addendum, attached as Exhibit "E"). 
The blood test taken of the Defendant/Appellant was taken by 
one Peter Hollis and one Pat Quinn (Transcript of Preliminary 
Hearing, Page 44 and Transcript of Motion to Suppress Hearing, Pages 
6 and 14). Mr. Hollis is a so-called "Physician1s Assistant" 
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(Transcript of Motion to Suppress Hearing, Page 6) and Mr. Quinn is 
a Park Ranger and Park Medic (Transcript of Motion to Suppress 
Hearing, Pages 13 and 14). Apparently, Mr. Hollis commenced to 
attempt to take a blood sample, but each time he attempted to insert 
the needle into Mr. Sterger1s vein, the vein collapsed. This was 
done several times (Transcript of Motion to Suppress Hearing, Page 
14) . Thereupon, Mr. Quinn inserted the needle into a vein of Mr. 
Sterger that did not collapse and Mr. Hollis withdrew the blood 
(Transcript of Motion to Suppress Hearing, Page 14) . Neither Mr. 
Hollis nor Mr. Quinn was a physician, registered nurse, or practical 
nurse as required by Section 41-6-44.10 (5) (a) , Utah Code Annotated 
and neither had been issued a permit to draw blood by the Utah 
Department of Health under Section 26-1-30(19), Utah Code Annotated, 
and as set forth in Section 41-6-44.10 U.C.A. (Transcript of Motion 
to Suppress Hearing, Pages 17, 18, and 30). 
The Defendant/Appellant filed two Motions to Suppress in the 
criminal case filed against him (Criminal No. 3368, Garfield County 
District Court), the first asking the Court to suppress any evidence 
taken from the Ford Bronco on the basis of an illegal inventory 
search and the second asking the Court to suppress the results of 
the blood test taken from the Defendant/Appellant on the basis of 
(1) that the blood sample was taken by persons not authorized by 
Sections 41-6-44.10(5)(a) and 26-1-30(19), Utah Code Annotated and; 
(2) that the officer had made a false statement of the law to Mr. 
Sterger to force him to allow the taking of the blood sample and 
further, that at the time of taking the blood sample, Mr. Sterger 
had not been placed under arrest and therefore, the "Implied Consent 
Law" of Utah (41-6-44.10 U.C.A.) was not applicable. 
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In addition, the Defendant/Appellant filed a Motion to Suppress 
in the civil forfeiture case filed against Defendant/Appellant's 
Ford Bronco vehicle (Civil No. 3350, Garfield County District 
Court) on the basis that the inventory search of the vehicle was an 
illegal inventory search and therefore, the evidence taken from the 
vehicle and to be used in the civil forfeiture case should be 
suppressed. It was stipulated by counsel before the Court, that all 
three Motions to Suppress in both the civil and criminal cases would 
be heard at the same time so as to save time in view of the fact 
that the same fact situation would exist in both cases. 
Upon the hearing of the three Motions to Suppress, the Sixth 
District Court for Garfield County overruled and denied all three of 
them (See Addendum, attached Exhibit "A") and Defendant/Appellant 
filed his Petition for Interlocutory Appeal from that Order. The 
Order was filed with the Clerk of the Garfield County District Court 
on February 1, 1990. 
V. SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
As Defendant/Appellant sees it, the inventory search(s) 
performed on his motor vehicle fail to meet the standards of the 
Fourth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution and Article I, Section 14 
of the Utah State Constitution and the cases construing the same for 
several reasons. They are as follows: 
Firstly, Garfield County did not have, at the time of the 
subject incident, any standardized police guideline directing its 
officers as to when and under what conditions they were to impound a 
motor vehicle. 
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Secondly, the existing Garfield County standardized police 
guidelines did not provide for or authorize bifurcated inventory 
searches. 
Thirdly, at the time of commencement of the subject inventory 
search on the "Burr Trail", the scene of the accident, the motor 
vehicle to be searched had not been impounded. 
Fourthly, when custody of the subject motor vehicle was changed 
from the investigating officer to the wrecker-driver, the wrecker-
driver did not place his signature on the inventory list as required 
by the existing Garfield County standardized police guidelines. 
Fifthly, the Garfield County standardized police guidelines 
require that a written inventory be made -of all contents of the 
vehicle, both in opened, closed and/or locked containers and the 
officer making the inventory search(s) opened some closed and/or 
locked containers located in the subject vehicle and did not open 
others, thereby exercising discretion not permitted by either the 
Garfield County standardized police guidelines or the applicable 
law. 
The blood test taken of the Defendant/Appellant was not taken 
pursuant to the applicable law. Neither person involved in taking 
the blood sample was authorized to do so by applicable law. In 
addition, the officer ordering the test made a false statement of 
the law to the Defendant/Appellant to force or trick him into 
allowing the test and in any event, the "Implied Consent Law" was 
not in effect at the time; the Defendant/Appellant not being under 
arrest at the time. 
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VI. DETAIL OF THE ARGUMENT 
A. WAS THE INVENTORY SEARCH AUTHORIZED AND LEGAL UNDER THE 
EXISTING CIRCUMSTANCES? 
While we are dealing with two separate cases, one consisting of 
a criminal prosecution against Defendant/Appellant and the other a 
civil or quasi-criminal action to forfeit a motor vehicle, it is 
clear that the constitutional rule requiring the exclusion of 
evidence obtained through an unlawful search and seizure is 
applicable to both proceedings. One 1958 Plymouth Sedan vs. 
Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, (1965) 380 U.S. 693, 14 L. Ed. 2d, 170 
85 S. Ct. 1246. Counsel for both parties stipulated that the record 
made would be applicable to both proceedings. 
The Fourth Amendment is not violated where a vehicle is 
impounded following an arrest for driving under the influence of 
alcohol and its contents are inventoried,where (1) there was no 
showing that the police, who following standardized procedures, 
acted in bad faith or for the sole purpose of investigation; (2) 
that the police were potentially responsible for the property taken 
into their custody; (3) that local police procedures governing 
inventory searches mandated the opening of closed containers and the 
listing of their contents; and (4) that those procedures established 
standardized criteria to govern an officer's choice between 
impounding a vehicle and simply parking and locking it. COLORADO 
vs. BERTINE, (1987), 479 U.S. 367, 93 L.Ed. 2d 739, 107 S. Ct. 738. 
Inventories of any sort of container, such as an automobile, made 
pursuant to standard police procedures with respect to containers 
taken by the police in custody are a reasonable search. South 
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Dakota vs. Opperman, (1976) 428 U.S. 364, 49 L. Ed. 2d 1000, 96 S. 
Ct. 3092. 
On the other hand, the standardized police procedures under 
which a warrantless inventory search is conducted must exist and the 
inventory search must be conducted pursuant to their mandates. 
State of Utah vs. Shamblin, (1988) 763 P.2d 425 (Utah App. 1988). 
The Utah Court of Appeals made the following statement in Shamblin: 
"With a standardized, mandatory procedure, the 
minister's picnic basket and grandmafs knitting bag are 
opened and inventoried right along with the biker's tool 
box and the gypsy's satchel". 
In Bertine at page 747 in a footnote, Justice Rehnquist made the 
following statement: 
"We emphasize that, in this case, the trial court 
found that the police department's procedures mandated the 
opening of closed containers and the listing of their 
contents. Our decisions have always adhered to the 
requirement that inventories be conducted according to 
standardized criteria. See Lafayette, 462 U.S. at 648, 77 
L. Ed. 2d 65, 103 S. Ct. 2605; Opperman, 428 U.S. at 
374-375, 49 L. Ed. 2d 1000, 96 S. Ct. 3092". 
In Bertine, Justice Powell, joined by Justice O'Connor and 
Justice Blackmum, made the following statement: 
"The Court today holds that police officers may open 
closed containers while conducting a routine inventory 
search of an impounded vehicle. I join the Court's 
opinion, but write separately to underscore the importance 
of having such inventories conducted only pursuant to 
standardized police procedures. The underlying rational 
for allowing an inventory exception to the Fourth 
Amendment warrant rule is that police officers are not 
vested with discretion to determine the scope of the 
inventory search. . . This absence of discretion ensures 
that inventory searches will not be used as a purposeful 
and general means of discovering evidence of crime. Thus, 
it is permissible for police officers to open closed 
containers in an inventory search only if they are 
following standard police procedures that mandate the 
opening of such containers in every impounded vehicle." 
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Garfield Countyfs police procedures (See Addendum, Exhibit "D" 
attached) are silent as to any standardized criteria to govern an 
officer's choice between impounding a vehicle and simply parking and 
locking it (See Bertine above) . Further, they are silent as to 
making any provision for a bifurcated search with the first and 
second parts taking place miles apart and after the passage of two 
day's time during which the custody of the vehicle changed hands and 
was not under police control, at least during part of that time, 
and during a portion of that time was parked outside an impound lot 
without supervision or control overnight. 
Garfield County's procedures mandate that "A written inventory 
shall be made of all contents of the vehicle, both in opened, closed 
and/or locked containers". The County's standardized procedures do 
not make any exception as to the opening of "closed and/or locked 
containers" although in this case, the searching officer did not 
open all closed and/or locked containers located in the subject 
vehicle. 
The County's standardized procedures are silent as to when and 
under what circumstances a vehicle is to be impounded, thereby 
leaving that to the discretion of the officer. 
When custody of a vehicle is changed, the County's standardized 
procedures require that certain signatures be affixed to an 
inventory list. This was not done in this case. 
The law requires that before the inventory search exception to 
the Fourth Amendment becomes applicable, the vehicle to be searched 
must have been impounded. In this case, the search was commenced 
prior to impoundment. 
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Discretion by the officer as to what closed and/or locked 
containers were to be opened was present in this case. This is 
impermissible* 
Shamblin and the other cases cited above require that not only 
must the standardized police procedures exist, but they must be 
followed. 
The inventory search of Defendant/Appellantfs motor vehicle was 
unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment and Article I, Section 14, 
of the Utah State Constitution and the cases construing the same. 
As a result, the evidence unlawfully taken therein must be ordered 
suppressed. 
B. WAS THE BLOOD SAMPLE LEGALLY TAKEN FROM THE 
DEFENDANT/APPELLANT WHEN THE PERSONS TAKING THE SAME WERE NOT 
AUTHORIZED BY LAW TO TAKE IT? 
Section 41-6-44.10(5)(a) Utah Code Annotated, reads as follows: 
"(5)(a) Only a physician, registered nurse, practical 
nurse, or person authorized under Subsection 26-1-30(19), 
acting at the request of a peace officer, may withdraw 
blood to determine the alcoholic or drug content. This 
limitation does not apply to the taking of a urine or 
breath specimen." 
Section 26-1-30(19) Utah Code Annotated, reads as follows: 
11
 (19) establish qualifications for individuals 
permitted to draw blood pursuant to Section 41-6-44.10, 
and to issue permits to individuals it finds qualified, 
which permits may be terminated or revoked by the 
department;11 
Peter Hollins and Pat Quinn, the persons taking the blood 
samples from Defendant/Appellant at the Bullfrog Clinic, were not 
authorized by the Department of Health to take blood samples. 
Neither of them was a physician, registered nurse, or practical 
nurse. In addition, neither had been issued a permit to take blood 
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by the Utah Department of Health, As neither Hollins nor Quinn was 
authorized by applicable statutes to take blood under the 
circumstances existing, the blood sample of Defendant/Appellant was 
illegally taken and the Court should order the results of the test 
made on the sample so taken suppressed. 
At the hearing of the Motions to Suppress before the Trial 
Court, counsel for Plaintiff/Respondent cited the Utah case of Gibb 
vs. Dorius (Utah 1975) 533 P. 2d 199 as standing for the proposition 
that a so-called "physician's assistant" was authorized to take 
blood under Section 41-6-44.10 U.C.A. At the time of Gibb, Section 
41-6-44.10 (f) , Utah Code Annotated, read as follows: 
"Only a physician, registered nurse, practical^nurse 
or duly authorized laboratory technician, acting at the 
request of a police officer can withdraw blood for the 
purpose of determining the alcoholic or drug content 
therein. . . any physician, registered nurse, practical 
nurse or duly authorized laboratory technician^ who^_ at 
the direction of a police officer, draws a sample of blood 
from any person whom the peace officer has reason to 
believe is driving in violation of this chapter, or 
hospital or medical facility at which such sample is 
drawn, shall be immune from any civil or criminal 
liability arising therefrom, provided such test is 
administered according to standard medical practice." 
Based upon the words "duly authorized laboratory technician" 
the Utah Supreme Court in Gibb stated that in certain cases a 
"physician1s assistant" could withdraw blood under Section 
41-6-44.10 U.C.A. 
As is to be noted, Section 41-6-44.10 U.C.A. has been amended 
since Gibb was decided and the words "duly authorized laboratory 
technician" taken from the statute. The words "person authorized 
under Subsection 26-1-30(19)" were substituted therefor. We are 
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therefore dealing with an entirely different statute than that under 
which Gibb was decided and the intent of the legislature seems 
clear. 
It is submitted that as the blood sample taken from Defendant/ 
Appellant was taken by unauthorized persons, the results of the 
analysis of that sample are not properly to be admitted as evidence 
against Defendant/Appellant. 
C. WAS THE BLOOD SAMPLE LEGALLY TAKEN OF THE 
DEFENDANT/APPELLANT WHEN IT WAS TAKEN AFTER THE OFFICER HAD MADE A 
WRONG STATEMENT TO THE DEFENDANT/APPELLANT REGARDING HIS BEING 
REQUIRED TO SUBMIT TO THE TAKING THEREOF AND PRIOR TO THE IMPLIED 
CONSENT LAW COMING INTO EFFECT? 
Section 41-6-44.10, Utah Code Annotated reads in part as 
follows: 
"(2) (a) If the person has been placed under arrest, 
and has then been requested by a peace officer to submit 
to any one or more of the chemical tests under Subsection 
(1), and refuses to submit to the chemical test or any one 
or all of the tests requested...". 
Based upon this provision of the statute, the Utah Supreme 
Court in State of Utah vs. Cruz (Utah 1968) 21 Utah 2d 406, 446 P.2d 
307 held that under the implied consent law (Section 41-6-44.10 
U.C.A.) implied consent of persons operating motor vehicles to 
submit to chemical tests for purposes of determining alcohol content 
of their blood arises only on arrest, and prior to arrest, actual 
consent must be obtained. 
Deputy Draper told Defendant/Appellant that he "was required to 
submit to a blood test since he was the driver of a vehicle involved 
in an accident resulting in the death of a passenger". The 
Defendant/Appellant thereupon submitted to the blood test. This 
statement of the officer was made prior to the time the 
Defendant/Appellant was placed under arrest. 
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The statement of Deputy Draper was not correct and in 
accordance with law. As far as counsel for Defendant/Appellant is 
aware, no such statement is authorized by law. The problem is that 
it placed force and coercion upon the Defendant/Appellant whether 
the statement was true or not and, in fact, no such force is 
authorized by law. As a result, it cannot be found that the 
Defendant/Appellant freely gave his permission to draw blood and as 
the same was taken by force, not authorized by law, the analysis of 
the sample taken must not be allowed as evidence against 
Defendant/Appellant. 
VII. CONCLUSION CONTAINING A STATEMENT OF 
THE RELIEF SOUGHT 
For the reasons stated, the evidence taken from 
Defendant/Appellant1s motor vehicle and the results of the blood 
sample taken from his body were taken illegally. 
The Court should reverse the decision of the District Court of 
Garfield County wherein it refused to suppress the evidence. It 
should further order that such evidence be suppressed and not be 
usable at trial. 
DATED this JO day of M f , 1990. 
.iip L. xFoi-emaster 
srney/for Defendant/Appellant 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILINC 
I hereby certify that on 
mailed four true and correct 
Appellant to Ms. Christine F 
fr t h i s
 ) ^ d aY °^ Zv&Y, 1990, I 
copies? of the foregoing Brief of 
Soltis, Assistant Utah Attorney 
General, 236 State Capitol, Salt Lake City, Utah 84114. 
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ADDENDUM 
Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution: 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, 
papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, 
shall not be violated, and no warrants shall issue, but upon 
probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly 
describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be 
seized. 
Article I, Section 14, Constitution of Utah: 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, 
papers and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures shall 
not be violated; and no warrant shall issue but upon probable cause 
supported by oath or affirmation, particularly describing the place 
to be searched, and the person or thing to be seized, 
Utah Code Annotated, Section 41-6-44,10(5)(a); 
(5) (a) Only a physician, registered nurse, practical nurse, or 
person authorized under Subsection 26-1-30(19), acting .at the 
request of a peace officer, may withdraw blood to determine the 
alcoholic or drug content. This limitation does hot apply to the 
taking of a urine or breath specimen. 
Utah Code Annotated, Section 26-1-30(19): 
(19) Establish qualifications for individuals permitted to draw 
blood pursuant to Section 41-6-44.10, and to issue permits to 
individuals it finds qualified, which permits may be terminated or 
revoked by the department. 
. XJ J- X C\ 
WALLACE A. LEE 115306 
Garfield County Attorney 
55 South Main Street 
Panguitch, Utah 84759 
Telephone: 67 6-229 0 
VaAhNKUJ WUUINI Y 
NO. ^&lk&~ FILED 
FEB- 11990 
IN THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF GARFIELD COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
f Cleri 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
MICHAEL ALLEN STERGER, 
Defendant 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Criminal No. 3368 
Civil No. 3350 
This matter having come on regularly for hearing before 
the above-entitled Court, Don V. Tibbs District Judge presiding, 
on January 4, 1990, on defendant's Motions to Suppress and 
Defendant being personally present before the Court and 
represented by his attorney Phillip L. Foremaster, and the State 
of Utah being represented by Wallace A. Lee, Garfield County 
Attorney, and certain witnesses having been sworn and having 
testified, and certain exhibits having been submitted to the 
Court, and the Court being fully advised in the premises, now 
makes and enters its1 Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law as 
follows: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. Defendant, Michael Allen Sterger, was the alleged 
driver of a vehicle involved in a collision on the Notam part of 
the Burr Trail in Eastern Garfield County in which Michelle 
ckroth was injured. The collision occurred on July 23, 1989, 
nd Michelle Eckroth allegedly later died of injuries sustained 
n the collision. 
2. Deputy Shawn Draper is a Garfield County Deputy 
heriff, and is the investigating officer in this case. Deputy 
raper is the only deputy sheriff covering the remote, area of 
astern Garfield County. 
3. After the collision, the said Michelle Eckroth, the 
efendant and two other passengers in the defendants1 vehicle 
ere transported from the scene by ambulance and were taken to 
ullfrog Clinic where all but the defendant were air lifted in a 
elicopter to Page Hospital. Defendants vehicle was left 
nattended, and partially blocking one lane of the road, creating 
potential danger to the safety of people traveling on the road. 
4. Deputy Draper impounded defendant's vehicle due to 
is concern for public safety, and since defendant and every one 
f his party had been transported away from the scene, there were 
o alternative arrangements which could be made for revoval of 
he vehicle. 
5. After impounding the vehicle, at the scene of the 
ollision, Deputy Draper began conducting an inventory search of 
he vehicle, for purposes of protecting himself and the Garfield 
ounty Sheriff's Department from possible liability for valuables 
nside the vehicle. In conducting the inventory search, Deputy 
raper substantially complied with regularized procedures of the 
arfield County Sheriff's Department. As a result of this 
nventory search, Deputy Draper seized a black film canister 
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containing a green leafy substance later analyzed and determined 
to be marijuana. 
6. Deputy Draper did not continue his inventory of the 
vehicle at the scene, because he was notified that Michelle 
Eckroth had died, and another passenger in the vehicle was 
accusing the defendant of drinking. Deputy Draper felt compelled 
to interrupt the inventory to go to Bullfrog Clinic to draw 
defendant's blood for a determination of alcohol content. There 
were no other Sheriff's deputies in the area that could have 
assisted Deputy Draper. 
7. Defendant's car was towed to Deputy Draper's 
residence, in Ticaboo, Utah, by Karl Hunt arid was secured. 
8. Defendant was at the Bullfrog Clinic when Deputy 
Draper arrived. Defendant had not been transported to Page by 
helicopter with the other passengers of the vehicle and Michelle 
Eckroth, due to lack of space in the helicopter. 
9. Bullfrog Clinic is a satellite clinic of Good 
Samaritan Hospital Corporation in Phoenix, Arizona, and is built 
on National Park Service land within the Glen Canyon National 
Recreation Area, pursuant to a Memorandum of Understanding with 
the National Park Service. 
10. The .internal policy of the Bullfrog Clinic and 
Good Samaritan, permits staff physician's assistants of the 
Bullfrog Clinic to draw blood for investigative purposes at the 
request of a law enforcement officer, and with the consent of the 
patient. 
11. Defendant was told by Deputy Draper that he was 
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required to submit to a blood test since he was the driver of a 
vehicle involved in an accident resulting in the death of a 
passenger. Defendant submitted to the blood test. 
12. Prior to drawing the blood, additional consent of 
the defendant was obtained by Bullfrog Clinic Physicianfs Assis-
tant Peter Hollis. 
13. Peter Hollis is licensed as a Physician's Assis-
tant by the State of Utah to practice under the supervision and 
direction of Dr. Dennis Little, a physician licensed in the State 
of Utah, and on the staff of Good Samaritcin Hospital in Page, 
Arizona. Dr. Little was not present at the* time the blood was 
taken, nor was there any consultation with Dr. Little. 
14. Peter Hollis is trained and qualified to perform 
venipuncture for purposes of drawing blood, by college training 
in the Yale University Physician's Assistantprogram, and by 
experience in a clinical setting. 
15. Venipuncture, including drawing of blood, is a 
regular part of Peter Hollis1 activities as a physician's assis-
tant at Bullfrog Clinic. 
16. Peter Hollis was assisted in drawing the defen-
dant's' blood by Pat Quinn, National Park Service Park Medic. 
17. Pat Quinn is a National Park Service certified 
Level 5 Park Medic, and is trained and qucilified to conduct 
venipuncture and draw blood. 
18. Pat Quinn regularly draws blood in a clinical 
setting as part of his normal activities as a Park Medic, and 
regularly assists the physician's assistant at the-Bullfrog 
Clinic, and acts under his supervision. The National Park 
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Service has adopted policy guidelines which allow Level 5 certi-
fied Park Medics to conduct venipuncture. Local Glen Canyon 
Office orders also allow Level 5 certified Park Medics to conduct 
venipuncture. 
19. Prior to attempting to insert a needle to draw 
blood from defendant's veins, Physician's Assistant Peter Hollis 
and Park Medic Pat Quinn cleansed the defendant's skin with 
Betadine solution and water rather than alcohol, as a precaution 
to avoid any possible taint of alcohol in the sample. 
20. Peter Hollis twice attempted to insert a catheter 
for withdrawal of defendant's blood, but both times collapsed 
defendant's vein. He then requested Park Medic Pat Quinn to 
attempt to find a vein. Pat Quinn was successful in inserting a 
catheter into defendant's vein, Peter Hollis then withdrew-the 
blood -af defendant, inserted it into two vials, enclosed the 
vials in a plastic bag and gave them directly to Deputy Shawn 
Draper. 
21. Peter Hollis and Pat Quinn followed standard 
medical procedures in withdrawing defendant's blood, in sanitary 
conditions at the Bullfrog Clinic, and took every precaution to 
obtain a proper blood sample. 
22. Due to the remoteness of the area surrounding the 
Burr Trail and the Bullfrog area, the Bullfrog Clinic was the 
only reasonable facility where defendant could have been taken 
for blood to be drawn. The closest alternative facility was 
approximately 2 hours away. 
23. Approximately two (2) days later, after 
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investigating the scene of the accident, and transporting the 
defendant to Koosharem,Utah, Deputy Draper returned to finish his 
inventory of defendant's vehicle, and the vehicle was moved 
approximately sixty (60) miles to Hanksville, Utah, and placed in 
the State impound yard. 
24. Prior to resuming his inventory, Deputy Draper 
contacted Garfield County Sheriff Robert V. Judd, who indicated 
that defendant's vehicle had been seized by the State of Utahr 
due to the marijuana found in the first inventory and there was 
no need to obtain a search warrant to resume the inventory. 
25. Deputy Draper continued his inventory for the 
purpose of protecting himself and Garfield County Sheriff Depart-
ment from liability for valuables inside defendant's vehicle. 
26. During the resumed inventory procedure, Deputy 
-Draper seized a tupperware container containing items later 
analyzed to be drug paraphernalia. 
27. The inventory search of the defendant's vehicle 
was reasonable and essentially in conformance with Garfield 
County inventory procedures. 
From the foregoing facts, the Court makes and enters 
it's conclusions of law as follows: 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. Section 41-6-44.10 (5) (a), states that only a 
physician, registered nurse, 'practical nurse, or person 
authorized under subsection 26-1-30 (19), acting at the request 
of a peace officer, may withdraw blood to determine the alcoholic 
or drug content. 
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2. The Court finds that the Utah Supreme Court, in the 
case of Gibb v. Dorius, 533 P2d 299 (1975), in interpreting the 
predecessor to the current statute which is substantially similar 
to the current Section 41-6-44.10 (5) (a), expressly found that 
the drawing of blood from a human being constitutes the practice 
of medicine and "falls within the purview of service rendered by 
a physician's assistant.... acting under the supervision and 
direction of a physician." 
3. In this case, due to the circumstances of the 
remote location, lack of reasonable alternative facilities to 
draw the blood, and due to the fact that the blood was drawn by a 
State licensed physician's assistant acting under the supervision 
and direction of a licensed physician and a certified Park Medic, 
fully trained and qualified to draw blood, since conducting 
venipuncture is a routine part of their respective positions, 
since Bullfrog Clinic and National Park Service policies permit 
the drawing of blood, since standard medical procedures were 
followed in sanitary environments, and all precautions were taken 
to avoid any possible contamination of the blood sample, the 
Court finds that the physician's assistant, Peter Hollis, and 
Park Medic, Pat Quinn, were qualified to draw defendant's blood, 
and the resulting blood samples were properly obtained and should 
not be suppressed as evidence. 
4. The Court finds that the defendant twice voluntari-
ly gonsented to having his blood drawn. 
5. The Court finds there was reasonable and proper 
justification for impoundment of defendant's vehicle for public 
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safety reasons, and further finds that the inventory search 
resulting in the seizure of marijuana and drug paraphernalia was 
reasonable, and essentially in conformance with a regularized set 
of procedures which adequately guarded against arbitrariness. 
6, The Court finds that Deputy Draper acted in good 
faith, in conducting the inventory search of defendant's vehicle 
with a purpose of protecting himself and the Garfield County 
Sherifffs Department from liability for valuables inside the 
vehicle. 
In accordance with the foregoing Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law, the Court finds that defendant's Motions to 
Suppress the blood sample taken from the defendant and to- sup-
press items removed from defendant's vehicle pursuant to Deputy 
Draper's inventory search should be denied. 
DATED this 1st day of February, 1990. 
BY THE COURT: 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that a full, true and col^ s^ ct copy of 
the foregoing FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW was placed 
in thei United States Mail, postage prepaid, on this the 1st day 
of February, 1990, addressed as follows: 
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Mr, Phillip L. Foremaster 
Attorney at Law 
P.O. Box 572 
St* George, Utah 84770 
Secretary 
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WALLACET A. LEE #5306 
Garfield County Attorney 
55 South Main Street 
Panguitch, Utah 84759 
Telephone: 676-2290 
IN THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF GARFIELD COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, ) 
Plaintiff, ; 
vs. 
MICHAEL ALLEN STERGER, ] 
Defendant. 
INFORMATION 
i Criminal No. 3 3J7 tf 
The undersigned, Wallace A. Lee, under oath states on informa-
tion and belief that the Defendant committed the crimes of: 
COUNT I: AUTOMOBILE HOMICIDE, a Second Degree Felony, 
Ln violation of Utah Code Annotated Section 76-5-207, in that, in 
Sarfield County, State of Utah, on or about the 23rd day of July, 
.989, he did operate a motor vehicle while having a blood alcohol 
:ontfent of .08% or greater by wejLgjxt< or while under the influence 
>f alcohol or any drug, or the combined influence of alcohol and 
my drug, to a degree which rendered him incapable of safely operating 
he vehicle and caused the death of another by operating the motor 
ehicle in a criminally negligent manner. 
COUNT II: POSSESSION OF A CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE (MARIJUANA), 
Class B Misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code Annotated Section 
8-37-8 (2) (a) (i), in that, in Garfield County, State of Utah, 
n or about the 23rd day of July, 1989, he did knowingly and inten-
State vs. Sterger 
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tionally possess a controlled substance, to-wit: Marijuana. 
COUNT III: POSSESSION OF DRUG PARAPHERNALIA, a Class B 
Misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code Annotated Section 58-37a-5, 
m that, in Garfield County, State of Utah, on or about the 23rd 
day of July, 1989, he did use or possess with the intent to use, 
drug paraphernalia ±_o ingest, inhale, or otherwise introduce a controlled 
substance into the human body. 
This Information is based upon evidence obtained from the 
following witness: Shawn Draper, 
COMPLAINANT 
Subscribed and sworn to before me this 31st day of October, 
1989. 
Residing at: Panguitch, Utah 
My Commission Expires: 
2-25-1990 
Notary Public 
v\(\/m(i,\J 
Authorized for 
r 
presentment and filing: 
County Attorney 
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PATRICK B. NOLAN 
Garfield County Attorney 
WALLACE A. LEE 
Deputy Garfield County Attorney 
55 South Main Street 
Panguitch, Utah 84759 
Telephone: 67 6-2290 
IN THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF GARFIELD COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
"HE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
s • 
ICHAEL ALLEN STERGER; and 
ne 1989 Ford Bronco, Serial 
o. 1FMEU15HXKLA39366, bearing 
alifornia License No. 2MRX883, 
Defendant. 
SUMMONS AND NOTICE OF 
SEIZURE AND INTENDED 
FORFEITURE 
Civil NO.A3 5Q 
3: MICHAEL ALLEN STERGER 
5712 Myra 
Cyprus, California 90630 
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN that the State of Utah has seized 
1989 Ford Bronco, Serial No. 1FMEU15HXKLA39366, bearing California 
cense No. 2MRX883. 
NOTICE IS FURTHER GIVEN that the State of Utah intends to 
oceed with forfeiture of said vehicle, pursuant to the provisions 
Utah Code Annotated Section 58-37-13. 
You are hereby summoned, and required to file an Answer, 
writing to the attached Verified Complaint, with the Clerk of the 
)ve-entitled Court; and to serve upon, or mail to WALLACE A, LEE, 
>uty Garfield County Attorney, 55 South Main Street, Panguitch, 
ih, 84759, a copy of said Answer, within 20 days after service 
State vs. Sterger 
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of this Summons and Notice upon you. 
If you fail to do so, judgment by default will be taken 
against you for the relief demanded in said Verified Complaint, which 
has been filed with the Clerk of said Court, and a copy of which is 
hereto annexed and herewith served upon you. 
DATED this Jls6 day of July, 1989. 
V H 
WALLACE A. LEE 
Deputy Garfield County Attorney 
GARFIELD COUNTT SHERIFFS DEPARTMENT 
l»ti» RPP 7 - P - S - 5 ^ . Thnn RPfl / ^ ^ t T 
Etta Served , , 1~%% a J^Tlmft^nrvad /0</^ 
Pcrs 
Officer, 
Atcinpts: 1st 2nd 3rd. 
Remarks , — 
D Served . , / £ £ S-4 i e cry /C 
on served ^UXlC%a^^hJ^ 
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PATRICK B. NOLAN 
Garfield County Attorney 
WALLACE A. LEE 
Deputy County Attorney 
55 South Main Street 
Panguitch, Utah 84759 
Telephone: 67 6-2290 
IN THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF GARFIELD COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
rs . 
ICHAEL ALLEN STERGER; 
ne 1989 Ford Bronco, 
o. 1FMEU15HXKLA39366, 
alifornia License No. 
Defendants. 
and ; 
Serial 
bearing 
2MRX883, 
VERIFIED COMPLAINT 
> Civil No. 3350 
FATE OF UTAH ) 
: ss. 
)UNTY OF GARFIELD ) 
Plaintiff, THE STATE OF UTAH, pursuant to Utah Code Annotated 
ction 58-37-13, alleges as follows: 
1. On or about July 24, 1989, in Garfield County, State 
Utah, the Garfield County Sheriff's Office seized the following 
scribed vehicle registered to Michael and Gina Sterger of Cyprus, 
Lifornia: 
One 1989 Ford Bronco, Serial No. 1FMEU15HXKLA39366, bearing 
ifornia License No. 2MRX883. 
2. Defendant MICHAEL ALLEN STERGER, is charged with the 
mes of: AUTOMOBILE HOMICIDE, a Second Degree Felony; POSSESSION 
A CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE, a Class B Misdemeanor; and, POSSESSION 
State vs. Sterger 
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OF DRUG PARAPHERNALIA, a Class B Misdemeanor. 
3. A controlled substance (Marijuana) and drug paraphernalia 
were seized from within the above-described vehicle, incident to the 
defendantf s 
4. The basis for such seizure is that said vehicle 
was being used or intended for use for the transportation, receipt, 
possession or concealment of controlled substances. 
WHEREFORE, THE STATE OF UTAH prays that the Court enter 
judgment against the defendant MICHAEL ALLEN STERGER as follows: 
1. That the Court adjudge and decree that the above-described 
vehicle was used or was intended for use, to transport, or to facilitate 
the transporation, sale, receipt, possession or concealment of said 
controlled substance. 
2. That the Court adjudge and decree that the defendant, 
MICHAEL ALLEN STERGER, has no right, title or interest in or to the 
above-described vehicle• 
3. That the above-described vehicle be forfeited to the 
State of Utah, and awarded to Garfield County. 
4. That THE STATE OF UTAH be awarded such other and further 
relief as to the Court may seem just and equitable in the premises, 
DATED this 7J% day of July, 1989 
WALLACE: A: LEE 
Deputy Garfield County Attorney 
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VERIFICATION 
STATE OF UTAH 
COUNTY OF GARFIELD ) 
ss. 
I, WALLACE A. LEE, being first duly sworn, upon my oath 
depose and say that the facts set forth in the foregoing Complaint 
are true and complete, to the best of my knowledge, information, 
and belief. 
WALLACE 
Subscribed and sworn to before me th 
1989. 
iso22 -th day of July, 
My Commission Expires 
2-25-1990 
•WJa. 
NOTARY PUBLIC 
Residing At: Panguitch, Utah 
%'?)/a^) 
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Garfield County Sheriff Department 
4.03 Court Cases and Appearances 
(1J Brployees shall not negotiate ony oorrprunise or arrangement permitting 
r*ny person to escape the penalty of the iuv cxr for any reason interfere with the 
court of justice. This shall not prevent any errployee from cooperating with the 
County Attorney in te interest of justice. 
(2) Deputies appearing in cases before the courts shall be punctual. 
•Jliey shall dress in uniform. 
(3} Deputies shall properly prepare cases with which they are involved 
-*7rl shall arrange for presentation in court of all property to be used as 
evidence. 
(4) At all times employees shall testify with accuracy and truth and 
conduct themselves in a professional manner and in accordance with the law 
enforcement code of ethics. 
4.04 Search and Rescuse Operations 
Search and rescue operations shall not be initiated by employees without 
tha approval of the Sheriff or Chief Deputy. In lefe-threatening situations, 
the deputy shall act in the best interest of the victim, notifying supervisors 
as soon as possible. 
4.05 Vehicle Inventories 
(1) Any vehicle impounded shall be inventoried. A written inventory stall 
be made of all contents of vehicle, both in opened, closed and/or looted containers. 
The truck and also any oenpartments shall be opened and the contents inventoried. 
All evidence seized in any inventory shall be placed in the evidence locker. Such 
:oeccccd shall become a part of the case file. When custody of the vehicle changes 
from one person to another, the person taking custody of the vehicle shall also 
assume custody of the. contents by placing his/her signature on the inventory list. 
(2) When a vehicle is removed on a hold-far-owner basis, immediate steps 
shall be taken to locate the owner and inform him of the location of the vehicle 
and hew he may regain possession. If the owner cannot be located with 24 hours, 
the vehicle shall be impounded. 
(3) When a vehicle is impounded for Driving Under the Influence, inproper 
registration, stolen or abandoned, the officer shall jjnreriiately complete a 
Utah State Tax Commission impound report and take to the T^LX OanTniss ion (Assessors 
Office). After the impound report has been taken care of, the officer shall not 
authorize the release of the vehicle without express consent of the T^x Commission 
or until the $25.00 ixrpound fee has been paid by the owner of said vehicle. 
(4) When an officer takes custody of a vehicle for hold-for-evix3ence, the 
officer shall cause notice to be placed on the vehicle stating that the vehicle 
is being held as evidence and he shall immediatley advise the Sheriff and the 
County Attorney. Such vehicle shall not be released without permission from 
the Sheriff or County Attorney. 
Policy-and Procedures Manual 
(5) Costs of tewing and storage of vehicles shall be the responsibility 
of the owner except for lz::»V.for-evi.de.nce c:r/l seized vehicles* In such cases 
financial arrangements ftx: c'zcfzvsje charges nrauid be made through the County 
Attorney or the Sheriff- i\r»y vcliicle impounded and r;tored at the Sheriff's 
Impound, lot shall be sufcoc::': to n minimum charge of $3.00 per calonder day. 
Storage fees to begin on the second day of impound. 
{fi) All vehicle keys r»hu2J. rt£main with the vehicle and shall be sur-
rendered to the owner or driver at the time the vehicle is released. 
4.06 Hazardeous Materials &nergency Response 
(i) The first officer dispatched to a hazardeoi:s materials emergency will 
approach and remain upwiixi(if possible) a safe distance from the spill. 
(2) The officer will secure the scene and set up a command post at which 
location dispatch will send all responding units for guidance. 
(3) If the container is on fire, withdraw from the area, call for trained 
personnel, and consider area evacuation. 
(4) In all cases , the incident should be handled by trained hazardeous 
materials responders if possible. 
(5) Once substance is identified and if there is no leaking product, no 
smoke or fire, and minor damage to container, first responder can then approach 
with caution. 
(6) Any fire units, antoulances, or wreckers called on the scene are to be 
advised of the hazardeous situation at once. 
4.07 Domestic Disputes 
It is the policy of the Garfield County Sheriff that in the event of a 
domestic dispute, two(2) officers will respond, even if an officer has to be 
called out. 
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Gil iff Hill' 
Agency: 
Suspect(s): 
STATE OF UTAH 
DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH 
STATE HEALTH LABORATORY 
PUBLIC SAFETY TOXICOLOGY SECTION 
4-1 Mcclic.il Drive. Sail Lake Cily. Uuh 8-111.'1 
GARFIELD S.O. 
STERGER, MICHAEL A. 
TOXICOLOGY REPORT 
Laboratory No. 
Your Agency Case No. 
L89-0831 
Officer: 
SHAWN DRAPER - 1Y4 
LABORATORY FINDINGS: 
Blood Alcohol: Negative 
BLOOO THC 
BLOOO COOH-THC METABOLITE = 
2.6 nanograms per milliliter 
28 nanograms per milliliter 
Analyzed by Wm. E. Stonebrake 
Chief, Public Safety Section 
SwGrn and Subscribed to before mc this
 01 day of A . 
31 August 
Notary Public 
1!) 89 
To\ L.ib LK-2 1 o/a:i 
